In this timely work, Dan Krier examines the relationship between two phenomena that dominated the economic scene in the late twentieth century: the rising power of financial markets and the restructuring of American industry. He argues that corporate governance was transformed during this period into speculative teams of stockoptioned executives and activist owners. These teams encouraged a vigorous restructuring of American industry through corporate buyouts, takeovers, reengineering, and downsizing. Often portrayed in business discourse as initiatives to enhance the efficiency and longrange profitability of industrial operations, these corporate changes were, instead, primarily what Krier describes as speculative management practices, used to manipulate the trading price of corporate securities, even at the expense of operational efficiency and longterm profitability. Krier also analyzes social intermediariesinstitutions that connect industrial firms to security markets and allow them to interact. He focuses on corporate governance structures composed of stockoptioned top managers, big owners, and their representatives on corporate boards; financial accounting rules and practices; and the business media that analyze corporate actions and results.